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THE ASSESSING AND COLLECTING OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY TAXES IN ESTATES OF
DECEASED PERSONS IN COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS
WILIAM M. JAMES1M ANY intricate legal problems have arisen in con-
nection with assessing, and collecting' personal
property taxes in estates of deceased persons in Cook
County. For example: Is there a duty on the per-
sonal representative to file a personal property tax
schedule which the deceased should have filed in his life-
time? What is the liability of the personal representa-
tive for personal property tax? Where should the tax
be assessed? Must a claim be filed against the estate
for personal property tax?
In order to arrive at definite conclusions in regard
to this subject it is necessary to consider both the early
and present provisions of the Revenue Act of Illinois,
as well as the early and the more recent decisions.
Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes of 1931 reads as fol-
lows:
Personal property shall be listed in the following manner:
... The property of a person for whose benefit it is held in trust,
by the trustee; of the estate of a deceased person, by the executor
or administrator.2
Listing on behalf of others to be done separately. Persons
required to list property on behalf of others, shall list it in the
same place in which they are required to list their own; but they
shall list it separately from their own, specifying in each case
the name of the person, estate, company or corporation to whom
it belongs.3
1 Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law; member of
Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Ch. 120, par. 6.
8 Ibid., par. 20.
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If any real or personal property shall be omitted in the assess-
ment of any year or number of years, or the tax thereon, for
which such property was liable, from any cause has not been
paid, or if any such property, by reason of defective description
or assessment thereof, shall fail to pay taxes for any year or
years, in either case the same, when discovered, shall be listed
and assessed by the assessor and placed on the assessment and
tax books. The arrearages of tax which might have been as-
sessed, with ten per cent. interest thereon, from the time the same
ought to have been paid, shall be charged against such prop-
erty by the county clerk. It shall be the duty of county clerks
to add uncollected personal property tax to the tax of any sub-
sequent year, whenever they may find the person owing such
uncollected tax assessed for any subsequent year.
4
If the tax or assessment on property liable to taxation is pre-
vented from being collected for any year or years, by reason of
any erroneous proceeding or other cause, the amount of such
tax or assessment which such property should have paid may be
added to the tax on such property for any subsequent year, in
separate columns designating the year or years.5
No such charge for tax and interest for previous years, as
provided for in the preceding section, shall be made against any
property prior to the date of ownership of the person owning
such property at the time the liability for such omitted tax
was first ascertained: Provided, that the owner of property, if
known, assessed under this and the preceding section, shall be
notified by the assessor or clerk, as the case may require.6
In McCleUan, Executor v. The Board of Review of
Jo Daviess County,7 the Supreme Court of fllinois con-
strued tlie aforementioned'paragraph 6 of Chapter 120.
This was an appeal by George W. McClellan, Executor
of the last will and testament of Robert'H. Mc-lellan,
deceased, from the decision of the Board of Review of
Jo Daviess County upon the certificate of the Auditor
4 Ibid., par. 291.
5 Ibid., par. 292.
O Ibid., par. 293.
7 200 Ml. 116.
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of Public Accounts under the provisions of section 35 of
the Revenue Act of 1898.
It appeared from the certificate of the clerk of the
Board of Review and the accompanying exhibits that
Caroline L. McClellan, a former wife of Robert H.
McClellan, died testate at Galena, Jo Daviess County,
February 14, 1876; that her will was admitted to probate
July 10, 1877, and letters testamentary were issued by
the Probate Court of said County to said Robert H.
McClellan on July 18, 1877; that Caroline L. McClellan,
deceased, left her surviving three children, George W.
McClellan, Mary McClellan and Robert Sanford McClel-
lan, for whom she made the following provision in her
will:
Fourth-The residue of my estate to be divided equally, share
and share alike, amongst my surviving children, and to be paid
to them upon their, respectively, reaching their majority. But
should any of my children, by reason of bad habits, or otherwise,
be unfit, in the judgment of my executor, to manage or con-
trol their property, then in such case the share of such child
shall be invested for his or her benefit and the income thereof
only paid such child till such time as he or she shall be fit to
take care of property.
Robert H. McClellan was named in the will as executor
without bond and given the following direction as to the
manner in which he should administer the estate:
No appraiser shall be appointed to appraise my estate. I author-
ize my executor to sell such portions of my estate as he may
deem best, and to make such investment of all moneys belonging
to my estate as he shall deem best for the same. He shall not
be required to inventory my estate, but shall take the same and
hold and manage my estate, and all property and moneys be-
longing thereto, as in his judgment shall appear best. My said
executor shall not be required to make any report to the county
or probate court, but shall pay over to my children the share of
each, according to the terms of this will, after deducting all
proper charges and costs. It is my will that no money shall
be paid to my children before their majority, excepting so much
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as my executor may deem proper or necessary for the educa-
tion and support of my said children. And provided, also,
that in case any one of my said children should require any
of his money to go into business, and my executor should deem
it safe and best, he may, in such case, advance a portion of
such child's money for that purpose.
The trust created in this will was accepted by Robert
H. McClellan and he continued to act as executor of the
will of said Caroline L. McClellan, deceased, until the
time of his death, which occurred at Galena, July 23,
1902.
On April 11, 1899, Robert H. McClellan made his will,
which after making provision for Clara D. McClellan,
his then wife, contained the following provision:
THIRD-AS I hold in ttust all the money and property which
belonged to the deceased mother of my children, George W. Mc-
Clellan, Mary McClellan and Robert Sanford McClellan, and
the accumulations thereof since her death, and which was de-
vised to my children by their said mother, -and in which, by an
ante-nuptial contract, I had no interest, and whereas the
amount of such fund, with the accumulated interest, now
amounts to $120,000, as near as I can estimate the same, making
the sum of $40,000, due on said fund to each one of my said
children, and which I owe to them and hold in trust for them;
and I hereby acknowledge that I owe my said children said sum
of $120,000, the same being the money devised to them by their
said mother and the interest on the same. The money was
loaned by me for the use and benefit of my said children and
an account thereof kept by me. A portion of this fund now
stands loaned by me, as trustee, and the rest in my own name.
This trust fund is a sacred fund and trust, and must be first
paid out of my estate. I have kept this fund loaned out for
the benefit of my said children, as I could invest and manage
it better for them than they could do themselves.
The estate of Caroline L. McClellan, deceased, had not
been settled by Robert H. McClellan at the time of his
death and the trust fund in his hands had not at that
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
time been distributed by him among the children of Caro-
line L. McClellan, deceased.
The will of Robert H. McClellan, deceased, was admit-
ted to probate by the Probate Court of Jo Daviess Coun-
ty on August 15, 1902, and George W. McClellan, his son,
who was named as executor therein, duly qualified as
such executor. After he had qualified he found in the
safe of said Robert H. McClellan, deceased, and took
possession of notes and mortgages to the amount of
$120,000 which represented the trust fund in the hands
of Robert H. McClellan, as executor of Caroline L.
McClellan, deceased, and which were admitted to be
good. It further appeared that said trust fund had
never been listed for taxation in Jo Daviess County by
Robert H. McClellan, as executor, or trustee; that the
notes were executed by non-residents and the mortgages
securing the same were upon lands located outside of the
State of Illinois; that the beneficial owners of the said
trust fund were, for the period intervening between
April 1, 1899, and April 1, 1902, non-residents of the
State of Illinois, Mary McClellan and Robert Sanford
McClellan during that time being residents of the State
of California and George W. McClellan a resident of the
State of Alabama; that no proof was offered to show
where said notes and mortgages were kept on April 1,
1902, or prior to that time and that there was no testi-
mony showing the amount of said trust fund, except as
hereinbefore set forth. The Board of Review assessed
George W. McClellan as executor of Robert H. McClel-
lan, deceased, upon said trust fund, the sum of $120,000
full value, assessed value of $24,000 for each year from
1899 to 1902 inclusive, and ordered the County Clerk to
extend the taxes, together with costs for those years.
It was contended in the case that as the beneficial own-
ers of said trust fund were non-residents of the State of
Illinois, and as there was no proof that the notes and
mortgages which represent said trust fund were within
the State of Illinois on the first day of April, 19U2, or
prior to that date, during the time for which the same
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were assessed, said fund was exempt from taxation in
this state, and the Board of Review erred in assessing
said fund. In reply to this contention the court stated:
It was contemplated by the framers of the constitution that
all property in this state should be listed for taxation unless
expressly exempted therefrom,8 and in part to effectuate that
intention section 6 of the Revenue Act (Hurd's Stat. 1899 p.
1394) was passed, which provides that every person of full
age and sound mind, being a resident of this State, shall list
all moneys and personal property invested, loaned or otherwise
controlled by him as the agent or attorney or on account of any
other person or persons, company or corporation, whatsoever,
and that personal property held in trust shall be listed by the
trustee, and that the estate of a deceased person shall be listed
by the executor or administrator of such estate. Under the pro-
visions of this act it was the duty of Robert H. McClellan to
list the personal property of Caroline L. McClellan, deceased, in
his hands as executor, for the purpose of taxation, and such
fund continued to be taxable in his hands until it was actually
distributed among the beneficiaries named in the will;9 and the
fact that the fund may have been loaned by the executor beyond
the jurisdiction of the state, through agents appointed in other
states, and that the securities taken therefor may have re-
mained for a time in the possession of such agents, did not
change the rule. The executor being a resident of this state
and the legal title to the fund being vested in him, this state
had jurisdiction over his person and over the fund and credits
which represented it, which, in legal contemplation, in the ab-
sence of any showing that they had a situs elsewhere, accom-
panied his person and were assessable in the county in which
he resided, as the general rule is, subject to certain exceptions
within which this case does not fall, that personal property tax-
able as credits has its taxable situs at the domicile of the credi-
tor.10
8 Citing People v. Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177.
9 Citing Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.), pp. 375, 376 and notes.
10Citing Goldgart v. People, 106 Ill. 25; People v. Davis, 112 1l.
272; Cooper v. Beers, 143 l. 25; Scripps v. Board of Review, 183 Il.
278; Hawgard v. Board of Review, 189 l. 234.
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It clearly appears that the fund in question was in the hands
of and under the control of the executor of Caroline L. McClel-
lan, deceased, during the four years for which it was assessed
by the Board of Review, and that it was not listed or taxed dur-
ing those years, and that the same was subject to taxation in
Jo Daviess County during that period. The decision of the
Board of Review, therefore, will be approved.
. The foregoing opinion has been cited at considerable
length because it is frequently referred to in later cases
in Illinois and is of importance in considering some of
the amendments to the Revenue Act of Illinois which will
be hereafter discussed.
One of the important things to notice about the fore-
going case is that Robert H. McClellan had in his posses-
sion and under his control on the first day of April the
assets of his wife's estate during the taxable years for
which they were assessed by the Board of Review of Jo
Daviess County.
At least two propositions of law appear to be obvious
from the foregoing decision. The first is, that it is the
duty of the personal representative of an estate to file a
schedule of the personal property which is in his pos-
session as such executor, administrator or trustee on the
first day of April of each year while he continues to act
as executor. The second is, that he is personally liable
for the tax which would have been assessed had he filed
a proper schedule, or which may be assessed by the Board
of Review in the absence of a schedule being filed. In
this connection, however, it should be borne in mind that
these two propositions apply only in case the property is
in the possession of the personal representative on April
1 of any given year for which the tax is assessed.
In People v. Hibernian Bank Association,11 the Illinois
Supreme Court again passed upon paragraph six afore-
said and the personal liability of the personal representa-
tive where he files or fails to file the schedule of personal
11 245 Ill. 522.
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES IN ESTATES
property in his hands as executor or administrator on
April 1 of any year. In this case an action was com-
menced in the Municipal Court of Chicago against the
Hibernian Banking Association for taxes for 1906
amounting to $526.16, and a writ of error was brought to
review this judgment. The case was tried by the court
without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts sub-
stantially as follows:
The Hibernian BankIng Association was administrator
of the estate of Daniel Sullivan, and had on February 1,
1906, the sum of $39,298.59 assets of the estate. During
February it distributed $22,297.00 to the heirs of Daniel
Sullivan, and on June 11, 1906, after giving notice of final
settlement of the estate, it filed a final report, the estate
was declared settled and it was discharged. In the mean-
time the county assessor had entered personal property
for taxation on the assessor's book by writing in book
11, on page 10, of South Chicago, First ward, personal
property, under index 'S', on the line used for listing
property, the words "Sullivan, Daniel, Est.," and oppo-
site thereto, as the property listed for taxation, the
amount of $40,000.00, and immediately above and beyond
the entry of the estate of Daniel Sullivan was written
in smaller letters, "Hibernian Banking Association,
Extr.," so that the entry appeared as follows:
Hibernian Banking Association, Extr.
Sullivan, Daniel, Est. .... $40,000
The amount of the taxes was not determined until the
fall of 1906, and they were not payable nor were the tax
books delivered to the collector until December, 1906.
The amount of money the plaintiff in error held as assets
of the estate on April 1, 1906, was $17,001.59. The taxes
on the $40,000.00 listed amounted to $526.16, and were
never paid. In its opinion the court said:
Paragraph 6 of section 6 of the Revenue Act requires the
personal property of the estate of a deceased person to be listed
by the executor or administrator, and section 19 requires it to
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be listed in the same place in which the executor or adminis-
trator is required to list his own property, but separately, speci-
fying the estate to which it belongs. It was the duty of the plain-
tiff in error to list for taxation the personal property of the
estate in its possession on April 1, 1906, and upon its failure to
do so it became the duty of the assessor to ascertain the amount
and value of such property and assess the same as he believed
to be the fair amount and value thereof. (Hurd's Stat. 1908,
see. 83, p. 1752.) Section 256 of the Revenue Act gives to every
person to whom, as agent or in a representative capacity, prop-
erty is assessed, a lien for the taxes upon such property and
all property of the principal in the possession of the person so
assessed. By virtue of the duty to list for taxation and the lien
given for the amount of the taxes, we have held that there ex-
ists a personal liability on the part of agents and others acting
in a representative capacity for the payment of the taxes upon
the property of others in the possession of such agents or rep-
resentatives. 12
It is insisted that the property on which the taxes were
levied was not owned by or in the possession or under the con-
trol of the person against whom the taxes were assessed, and in
this connection attention is called to the fact that the property
was in the form of money, that it amounted to less than one-
half of the assessment and that there was no opportunity for
valuation. It is true that an assessment of personal property
against one who was not, on the first day of April in the year
for which the assessment was made, the owner of the property
or interested in it and had not possession or control of it is with-
out authority of law. But this is not such a case. The plaintiff
in error had property which it was its duty to list. It did not
do so, and as required by the statute the assessor assessed it ac-
cording to his judgment of the fair amount and value thereof.
There is no claim that the assessment was fraudulent, that there
was not a fair exercise of judgment, or that the valuation ar-
rived at was not justified by the means of knowledge at hand.
Plaintiff in error having failed to furnish the information neces-
sary to a correct assessment, the records of the Probate Court
12 Citing Scott v. People, 210 fl. 594; Walton v. Westwood, 73 fI1.
125; Lockwood v. Johnson, 106 Ill. 334.
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could be availed of as well as such other sources of information
as existed. The valuation of property for taxation is not, in
the absence of fraud, subject to the supervision of the courts.13
Mere over-valuation is not sufficient to establish fraud.14 Cir-
cumstances in connection with the over-valuation may be suffi-
cient to establish the fraudulent character of an assessment. 15
In this case, however, nothing has been shown as to the valua-
tion except that the assessment exceeds the amount which was
in the possession of the plaintiff in error on the first day of
April .... The assessment in this case was lawfully made by
the proper authority and at the proper time. The property
was rightly assessed to the plaintiff in error. Having failed to
avail itself of the remedy provided by law for an over-valua-
tion in the assessment it cannot now successfully resist the pay-
ment of the tax.
It must be noted, in reviewing this case, that plaintiff
in error was acting as executor on April 1, 1906, the year
for which the assessment involved in this suit was levied.
Though there have been a number of amendments to the
Revenue Act of Illinois since the two aforementioned
cases were decided, the duty of the personal representa-
tive, with respect to filing a schedule and the liability
of the personal representative for personal property tax
assessed as of April 1 in any year in which he was act-
ing on that date is still the same as set forth in the two
aforementioned cases.
It now becomes necessary to consider the liability of
a personal representative or the beneficiaries of an estate
for personal property tax assessed against the personal
property of a deceased person where the executor or ad-
ministrator was not acting as such executor or adminis-
trator on April 1 of the year or years for which the
assessment was levied, and the duty of such executor
or administrator to file a schedule for the year or years
1 Citing Keokuk v. Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, 185 Il. 276;
Burton Stock Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 Ill. 9.
14 Citing People v. Bourne, 242 Ill. 61.
15 Citing Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. R. Co. v. Cole, 75 Ill.
591; State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528.
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preceding his appointment. This liability must be con-
sidered during several different periods of time in order
to arrive at a proper understanding of the same.
The first period to be considered extends from 1872
to July 1, 1915. In Scott et at. v. The People,16 an action
in debt was brought by "The People" against George
W. Scott. A demurrer to the declaration was overruled.
In default of further pleading, judgment was entered
against Scott, in the sum of $14,045.58 and costs. A
writ of error was sued out to bring the judgment into re-
view in the Supreme Court. The praecipe and summons
ran against the plaintiffs in error in their representative
capacity as executors of the last will of Church Stur-
tevant, deceased. The declaration charged personal lia-
bility, and by leave of the court the praecipe and sum-
mons were amended by striking out the words "as exe-
cutors of Church Sturtevant, deceased."
The substantial averments in the -declaration may be
briefly stated as follows.: One Church Sturtevant, de-
ceased, a resident of Henry County, Illinois, departed
this life on the ninth day of November, 1899, leaving
a last will, by which he nominated and appointed the plain-
tiffs in error executors of the will; that on the first day of
May in each of the years 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895,
1896, 1897 and 1898, and on the first day of April, 1899,
said Church Sturtevant was a resident of Henry Coun-
ty, and was possessed of and owned " notes, bonds, credits
and choses in action" liable to be assessed for taxation
and to be taxed; that said credits were not listed by said
deceased for assessment nor were they assessed; that
in the year 1900 (after the death of said Sturtevant) the
county treasurer of Henry County, as supervisor of as-
sessments, assessed said credits as omitted property,
and the county clerk extended taxes on the books of the
collector of taxes on the same as omitted property; that
the collector demanded of the plaintiffs in error payment
of the amount so extended; that the plaintiffs in error
16 210 Il. 594.
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refused to pay the same; that on the thirtieth day of
August, 1901, a claim therefor was filed in the Probate
Court against the plaintiffs in error as the executors
of said estate, and that the same was withdrawn on- the
twenty-fourth day of November, 1902; that the plain-
tiffs in error, as executors, received credits belonging
to their testator at the time of his death, amounting, in
the aggregate, to the sum of $122,000.00, which, as they
well knew, had not been assessed for taxation during
said years previous to the death of the testator; that
the Board of Review of Henry County, on July 30, 1902,
notified plaintiffs in error to appear before them, and
assessed said credits for each of said years 1890 to
1899, inclusive, and placed the same on the rolls against
plaintiffs in error, as executors of said estate; that after-
wards, on August 13, 1902, objections to said assessment
were heard,, and plaintiffs in error appeared and the as-
sessment was modified; that at that time they had on
hand assets of said estate sufficient to pay the taxes
so assessed, including the interest thereon; that there-,
after the tax rates for the years named were applied to
said assessment and extension made by the county clerk,
together with ten per cent per annum interest from the
time the same ought to have been paid by said Church
Sturtevant; that the total amount of such extension and
interest is $14,045.58; that a warrant was issued to the
collector on January 28, 1903; that demand was made
thereon and refused; that the board of supervisors of
Henry County directed this action to be brought, by
means whereof plaintiffs in error became liable to pay
the plaintiff (the People) $14,045.58.
Judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs in error
as individuals. In its opinion the court said:
The determination of the-contention of the defendant in error
that the plaintiffs in error became liable personally for the pay-
ment of the alleged omitted taxes is the sole question which
we deem it necessary we should discuss.
The proposition advanced is, that though the property liable
to be taxed was that of the testator and the omission to list the
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same for taxation during the various years was that of the testa-
tor, and though the assessment made by the Board of Review
more than two years after the death of the testator was against
the plaintiffs in error in their representative capacity as execu-
tors, and not individually, liability to pay the tax is made the
personal liability of the executors by the provisions of section
256 of Chapter 120 of our statutes. (3 Starr & Cur. Stat. 1896,
par. 258, p. 3510.) The section reads as follows: "When prop-
erty is assessed to any person as agent for another, or in a
representative capacity, such person shall have a lien upon such
property, or any property of his principal in his possession,
until he is indemnified against the payment thereof, or, if he
has paid the tax, until he is reimbursed for such payment."
The insistence seems to be, that as the executors have the pos-
session and legal title to the property of the testator, and are
by this statute given a lien on the property to indemnify them-
selves or to reimburse themselves for any payment of taxes made
by them, the liability arises in favor of the taxing power to look
to them, as individuals, for the payment thereof. We think
this section has reference to persons acting as agents or in some
representative capacity, who at the time fixed by the statute
for the assessment of property for taxation had property in
their hands, as agents or in some representative capacity, which,
under the provisions of section 6 of said Chapter 120, it became
their duty to list for assessment in their names as agents or in
such representative capacity, and who, by reason of such list-
ing, became liable to pay the taxes under the provisions of said
section 256 of the Revenue Act.
The case made by the declaration is, that the testator of plain-
tiffs in error failed to list notes, credits, etc., for taxation during
his lifetime, and that the Board of Review, after his death,
caused an assessment to be entered against his executors for the
omission on his part, during the years 1890 to 1899, inclusive,
to return his property for assessment as the law requires. We
are not aware of any statute requiring the executor of a de-
ceased person to make lists for assessment of property omitted
to be made by the testator during his lifetime. The executors
are not, therefore, to be charged with a failure to perform a
statutory duty as a basis for creating an individual liability
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against them, and we are unable to understand upon what theory
they can be held personally liable to pay taxes upon property
which their testator should have listed.
The judgment must be reversed, and the cause will be re-
manded for such further and other proceedings as to law and
justice may appertain.
In this case it is worth noting that the deceased died
on November 9, 1899; that a portion of the tax being
sued for was predicated upon an assessment as of April
1, 1899. The opinion clearly holds, first, that at the time
this case was decided there was no duty upon the execu-
tor or administrator requiring him to make lists for as-
sessment of property omitted to be made by the testator
during his lifetime, and secondly, that an executor or
administrator does not become individually liable for a
tax based upon an assessment predicated upon an esti-
mate of the personal property in the hands of a deceased
person on any April 1 prior to his death, even though
such an assessment is made while the executors are still
acting as such.
In People v. Sears,17 substantially the same proposi-
tions of law were again before the Supreme Court of
Illinois. There Richard W. Sears, a resident of Lake
County, Illinois, died in September, 1914, leaving per-
sonal property which was appraised for the purpose of
ascertaining the inheritance tax, at nearly $13,000,000.
By his will he gave all of his property to his widow,
Anna L. Sears, and nominated her as executrix. The
subject matter of the suit is a claim of the state for
taxes on the personal property of Sears alleged to have
been omitted from assessment in his lifetime for the
years 1907 to 1912 inclusive. The appeal is by Mrs.
Sears, individually and as executrix, from a decree of
the Circuit Court of Lake County rendered upon a bill in
chancery in the name of the People. By this decree the
property received under the will was charged with a lien
17 344 i1. 189.
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for the payment of taxes found to be due on Sears'
property omitted from assessment during the years
stated. The facts further show that Sears was a resi-
dent of the Village of Oak Park, in Cook County, on the
first day of April in each of the years for which taxes are
claimed in this proceeding, except 1912. He removed
from Oak Park to Lake County in 1912. An assessment
of personal property was made against him by the as-
sessor of the town of Oak Park in each of those years,
except 1912, upon which taxes were extended, and he
paid in his lifetime the taxes so extended. From 1912
until his death he was a resident of Lake County, and the
case does not concern any taxes during that time or in
that county. The bill was filed originally in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, but the venue was changed to
Lake County, and Mrs. Sears answered, both individu-
ally and as executrix. Mrs. Sears resisted the collection
of the taxes on the ground that at the time Sears died no
liability existed for the payment of taxes of any decedent
which had been omitted from assessment during his life-
time. The court, in its opinion, said:
If this contention is correct it will not be necessary for us to
consider any of the other points raised.
The liability of the owner of property for the payment of
taxes is purely statutory. The law is well settled that the leg-
islative power of a state to provide for the levy and collection
of taxes is unlimited, except as restricted by the State and Fed-
eral constitutions.18 The obligation of the citizen to pay taxes
is purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed
and collected only in the mode pointed out by express statute....
The Revenue Act of 1872 provided for the assessment of real
or personal property which had been omitted in the assessment
of any year and the placing of it on the assessment and tax
books. The provisions for such assessments are contained in
sections 276, 277 and 278 of Chapter 120 (Cahill's Stat. 1929,
sees. 291, 292, 293), and are as follows:
The court then quotes paragraphs 291, 292, and 293 of
18 Citing Chambers v. People, 113 Il. 509.
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES IN ESTATES
Chapter 120 of Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes of 1931
which are hereinbefore set forth verbatim, and con-
tinues:
The statute thus provided for the assessment of omitted prop-
erty. During Sears' lifetime none of the omitted property was
assessed, therefore no liability existed against Sears in his life-
time for any omitted taxes. He had paid all the taxes assessed
against him. None of the property involved in this suit which
he owned at the time of his death had ever been assessed. Sec-
tion 276 (par. 291) provided for the assessment of omitted prop-
erty when discovered, and required the county clerk to add un-
collected personal property taxes to the taxes of any subsequent
year whenever he should find the person owing such uncollected
tax assessed for any subsequent year. Its provisions clearly
apply only to the omitted property of a living person, as it
would obviously be impossible for the county clerk to find and
tax a person who was dead. Section 277 makes no reference to
an omitted tax but refers merely to uncollected taxes. This
court in People v. National Box Co., 248 Ill. 141, held that sec-
tion 277 "deals only with a tax which had been already levied
and had not for some reason been collected." This section,
therefore, has no bearing upon the question of omitted taxes,
and would only have applied if Sears had failed to pay taxes
levied against him, which is not true in this case. Section 278
provides that "no such charge for tax and interest ... shall be
made against any property prior to the date of ownership of
the person owning such property at the time the liability for
such omitted tax was first ascertained, etc.
The liability for such omitted tax was not ascertained dur-
ing the lifetime of Sears, who died in September, 1914. The
assessments for omitted taxes are for the years 1907 to 1912,
both inclusive. The petition for assessment of omitted per-
sonal property of decedent was not presented to the Board of
Review of Cook County until September, 1915, and the assess-
ments now in question were not made by the board until Sep-
tember, 1916. At the death of Sears, in 1914, there was a
change of ownership. His will gave all his property to his
widow at the instant of his death, subject only to the payment
of his debts. There was no tax debt at that time, because dur-
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ing his lifetime there had been no assessment for omitted taxes.
After his death and the change of ownership to his widow any
charge against the property for taxes and interest for previous
years was expressly prohibited by section 278 (par. 293 Cahill's
1931 Statutes). If there is any doubt whether the sections in
question authorized a charge for taxes against the legatee on
account of property omitted from assessment by a deceased
owner and devised by him, the language of the statute cannot
be extended beyond its clear import to make the property sub-
ject to the taxation. Such statutes imposing a tax, in case of
doubt, are construed most strongly against the government and
in favor of the citizen.19 There could be no valid subsequent
assessment, for the reason that the statute expressly prohibited
an assessment after a change of ownership. While the execu-
trix held the legal title the sole beneficial ownership was in the
legatee or heir. If Sears had transferred all of his money and
personal property to another in his lifetime there would have
been a change of ownership, which under the express terms of
section 278 (par. 293 Cahill's 1931 Statutes) would have pre-
vented any charge against the property for taxes or interest of
previous years. He did make a transfer by his will, which had
the same effect at the moment of his death as a transfer by a
grant and delivery of possession would have had in his lifetime.
The fact that the new owner of his property was his widow
made her position no different from that of a stranger, as no
exceptions are made in section 278 (par. 293 Cahill's 1931 Stat-
utes) to its general prohibition against the assessment of omit-
ted property after a change of ownership.
Even if the language of section 276 (par. 291 Cahill's 1931
Statutes) were construed to authorize an assessment of omitted
taxes of a decedent the provisions of section 278 (par. 293 Ca-
hill's 1931 Statutes) would nullify the authorization. The lan-
guage used in section 278 compels the conclusion that it refers
to section 276. Section 278 provides, "No such charge for tax
and interest . . . as provided in the preceding section." The
only previous reference to "interest," or the duty of the clerk
to "charge" it against property, is in section 276. Section 278
19 Citing Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Board of Review, 264 Il. 11;
People v. Barrett, 309 Il1. 53.
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also refers to the "person owning such property at the time the
liability for such omitted tax was first ascertained." The use
of the phrase "such omitted tax" shows that section 278 referred
to and qualified section 276, as that section deals with omitted
taxes while section 277 does not mention omitted taxes but re-
fers only to uncollected taxes. In People v. National Box Co.,
supra, this court had occasion to consider the relation of section
278 to sections 276 and 277. No question of the assessment of
omitted taxes against the estate of a deceased person was in-
volved in that case, which had to do with corporate franchise
taxes, but it was there held that notwithstanding the reference
in section 278 to "the preceding section," its provisions ex-
tended not only to section 277 but also to section 276. It was
there also held that the use of the word "preceding" referred
not only to section 277 but also to section 276. Moreover, the
ordinary definition and use of tlie word "preceding" does not
limit its application exclusively to the section immediately pre-
ceding it, as the words "next preceding" or "immediately pre-
ceding" are generally used when such restricted application is
intended. A consideration of these three sections therefore fails
to reveal any authority for an assessment of omitted taxes
against a decedent's estate. Neither one of them contains any
reference to the property of a deceased person. No directions
are contained in either section for the assessment and collection
of omitted taxes, in case of a deceased person, as to whether the
executor, administrator, trustees, creditors, heirs, legatees or
devisees shall be proceeded against, and no method of procedure
in such cases is provided.
The court then discussed four cases cited by the peo-
ple and continued as follows:
What has been said thus far concerns only sections 276, 277
and 278 as they were originally enacted as a part of the gen-
eral Revenue Act of 1872. They continued in force without
change, except by a minor amendment to section 277 not neces-
sary to be now considered, until the Revenue Act of 1898 was
passed, section 35 of which provided that "the Board of Review
shall: First, assess all property subject to assessment which
shall not have been assessed by the assessors." The effect of
this provision was to modify section 276 so as to take from the
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local assessors the power and duty of assessing property which
had been omitted in the assessment of any previous year or
years and imposed that duty on the Boards of Review of the
various counties.20 The Act of 1898 was "An act for the as-
sessment of property and providing the means therefor, and to
repeal a certain act therein named." The act repealed was
an act to provide for the election of assessors in certain townships
and its repeal does not concern this case. Section 55 of the act
of 1898 declares that "all the provisions of the general Revenue
-law in force prior to the taking effect of this act shall remain
in force and be applicable to the assessment of property and
collection of taxes except in so far as by this act is otherwise
expressly provided." Therefore, while section 276 was modi-
fied by the transfer of the power of assessing omitted property
by the local assessors to the board of review section 278 was
in no way affected, and the prohibition of any assessment of
omitted property subsequent to a change of ownership remained
in force and continued to be in force until July 1, 1915, nearly
a year after Sears' death. The Forty-ninth General Assembly
amended section 35 of the Act of 1898, and by this amend-
ment, which became effective July 1, 1915, for the first time
provided for an assessment, after his death, against property
omitted from assessment by the owner in his lifetime, the
assessment to be made in the name of the decedent's personal
representative, the amount of the tax, when ascertained, to be
made a claim of the first class against his estate by the proceed-
ings provided for by the amended section.
This amendment has no application to this case unless it is
given effect retroactively to create a cause of action which had
no existence at the time of Sears' death. While the appellee con-
tends that under sections 276, 277 and 278 and original section
35 an assessment could be made against the estate and Mrs. Sears,
we hold that those sections do not authorize such an assessment.
When a statute is amended "so as to read as follows," as in the
case of this amendment, the amendment has no retroactive force.
The part of the original act which remains unchanged is con-
sidered as having continued in force as the law from the time of
its original enactment and the new portion as having become
20 Citing People v. Sellars, 179 Ill. 170.
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the law only at the time of the amendment .... The provisions
for the assessment of real or personal property omitted from
taxation by a decedent during his lifetime are all contained in
the second and third paragraphs of this amendment and must
be considered as having become the law on July 1, 1915, and
afforded no basis for the attempt of the Board of Review to
assess the property omitted by Sears in his lifetime against Mrs.
Sears, either as his legatee or the executrix of his will. The
moment he died her rights under his will attached. Her title
was then vested, and no change in the law thereafter made could
disturb such vested rights.21 The title to all his property was
yested in her, subject to his debts. Since there could be no tax
without an assessment there was no debt, and since section 278
prohibited any assessment against the property prior to the
date of her ownership there never could be any assessment or
any debt. "The moment the testator or intestate dies then the
rights of the devisees or heirs attach at once, for the title is then
already vested, and any change in the law after that could not
affect such vested rights." 22 Mrs. Sears from the death of her
husband was the sole and absolute beneficial owner of all the
property which he owned at his death, subject only to the pay-
ment of his lawful debts. It was not within the power of the
State thereafter, by mere legislation, to impose upon her any
additional obligation or to create any charge against her prop-
erty. To do so would be taking of her property without due
process of law.... Since the statute at the time of the death of
the decedent made no provision for the assessment after his death
of personal property which he had owned but which had been
omitted from assessment in his lifetime in various years, as
claimed by the bill, the decree of the Circuit Court is without
foundation in the law for its support.... For the reasons given
the decree is reversed.
From the foregoing opinion in the Sears Case and in
the Scott Case it seems clear that the executor, adminis-
trator or persons beneficially interested in the estate of
a deceased person prior to July 1, 1915, were under no
obligation to schedule property of their decedent which
21 Oiting Rowlett v. Moore, 252 Ill. 436.
22 Quoting from Sturgis v. Ewing, 18 11. 176.
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he had in his hands on any April 1 preceding his death
and were not liable, nor was his property liable for the
payment of any tax upon omitted property where such
tax was assessed after his death; said tax being predi-
cated upon an estimate made by the assessing authori-
ties.
It now becomes desirable to consider the period be-
tween July 1, 1915, and February 13, 1932, and there-
after to consider the effect of Senate Bill No. 14 ap-
proved February 13, 1932, which amended and added
sections to the Revenue Act of Illinois forming the basis
for the appointment of the present local assessor and
Board of Appeals in Cook County, Illinois.
There are two cases cited by the Supreme Court of
Illinois during the period intervening between, July 1,
1915, and February 13, 1932, which are of importance.
In the first of these cases, Board of Education v.
Boger,"3 the opinion was filed on December 17, 1919, and
a re-hearing was denied on February 5, 1920. In this
case the Board of Education of Glen Ellyn Township
High School District No. 87 and the Board of Education
of School District No. 41 of the County of Du Page
filed a petition for mandamus in the Circuit Court of Du
Page County against the appellees, George Roger and
others, members of the Board of Review of said county,
Aaron A. Kuhn, County Clerk, the Directors of School
District No. 38, and Alfred C. Hoy, administrator of the
estate of William P. Cowan, deceased. To the appellants'
petition appellees filed a general demurrer, which was
sustained by the court and judgment thereon entered.
This judgment was attacked by the appeal. The facts
stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer are
the following:
William P. Cowan resided during the years 1914 to
1918, both inclusive, in school district No. 38, in said
county, and continued to live therein up to his death,
28 291 fl1. 191.
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August 13, 1918. On September 9, 1918, Alfred C. Hoy,
public administrator of said county, was by the County
Court of Du Page County appointed administrator of
the estate of the deceased and took charge of the assets
of his estate and has since continued to act as such ad-
ministrator, and on April 1, 1919, was residing in Glen
Ellyn Township High School District No. 87 and school
district No. 41 in the village of Glen Ellyn, in said county.
The local assessor made and entered the personal prop-
erty assessment for the year 1919 against Hoy, as ad-
ministrator aforesaid, at his residence, in the sum of
$1,500,000 full value. That amount was reduced by the
board of review to the sum of $1,325,000 full value. The
board of review, during its session for the year 1919,
found that Cowan had not listed for assessment certain
personal property owned by him for the years 1914 to
1918, both inclusive, while he was so residing in school
district No. 38. The board of review thereupon made
and entered a personal property assessment against the
personal property of Cowan, and assessed the same
in the name of Alfred C. Hoy, as administrator of the
deceased, upon credits and other personal property
found by the board to be omitted from the assessment
and taxation, as follows: For 1914, $575,000 full value,
$191,667 assessed value; for 1915, $635,000 full value,
$211,667 assessed value; for 1916, $875,000 full value,
$291,667 assessed value; for 1917, $980,000 full value,
$326,667 assessed value; for 1918, $1,220,000 full value,
$406,667 assessed value. The board of review made and
entered the assessment for back taxes from the property
so omitted from taxation for said years in school district
No. 38, after due notice to the administrator. Hoy does
not, and never did, reside in school district No. 38, and
Cowan never resided in Glen Ellyn Township High
School District No. 87 or in school district No. 41. Ap-
pellees Boger, Senne and Reed constitute the board of
review. Appellee Kuhn is the county clerk, and declared
that he will follow the entry of said assessments for such
omitted years in school district No. 38 and will extend
the taxes thereon for said years in said district, and will
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not extend the assessments and the taxes for said years
in Glen Ellyn Township High School District or school
district No. 41 unless ordered by the court. Appellants
were organized school districts, conducting schools and
levying and collecting taxes for the same during all of
said years. The prayer of the petition is that the taxes
on the property omitted from assessment by Cowan for
said years be assessed in Glen Ellyn High School Dis-
trict No. 87 and school district No. 41 in the Village of
Glen Ellyn, where Hoy resided, and not in school district
No. 38.
The court says the question to be decided is whether
the omitted property for the years above mentioned
should be assessed in the district and collected for the
district where the decedent resided at the time the prop-
erty was omitted from assessment, or whether it should
be assessed and collected for the districts where his ad-
ministrator resided on April 1, 1919. The only taxes in-
volved are the omitted taxes for the years mentioned.
No question is raised concerning the current taxes for
the year 1919.
The court first points out that sections 6 and 19 of our
Revenue Act, which paragraphs are hereinbefore set
forth verbatim, apply only to property in the hands of
the legal representative of a deceased person on April
1 of any given year, and then continues:
He cannot be, and is not, regarded by the statute as the legal
owner or possessor of the decedent's property at any time during
the lifetime of the decedent.
The omitted assessments and taxes in question in this case are
for prior years, and the property was not owned or possessed
by the administrator but by the decedent in his lifetime. The
question whether or not the property shall be taxed in school
district No. 38 or in the appellant school districts is to be solved
entirely from a consideration of sections 276, 277, 278 and sec-
tion 35 (or paragraph 329) as amended in 1915, because they
are the only sections applicable to the question.
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The opinion of the court then sets forth verbatim sec-
tions 276, 277 and 278 of the Revenue Act which sections
are respectively paragraphs 291, 292 and 293 of Chapter
120 of Cahill's Illinois Revised Statutes 1931.
The court in its opinion next sets forth the provisions
of'section 35 of the Revenue Act, which section is para-
graph 346 of Chapter 120, Cahill's Illinois Revised
Statutes 1931 and at the time the opinion was written
read as follows:
See. 35. The board of review shall, in any year, whether the
year of the quadrennial assessment or not:
.First-Assess all property subject to assessment which shall
not have been assessed by the assessor, and list and assess all
property real or personal that may have been omitted in the as-
sessment of any year or number of years, or if the tax thereon,
for which such property was liable, from any cause has not been
paid, or if any such property, by reason of defective description
or assessment thereof shall fail to pay taxes for any year or
years,. in either case the same, when discovered, shall be listed
and assessed by the board in its revision of assessments, and the
board may make such alterations in the description of real or
personal property as it shall deem necessary.
Second-No such charge for tax of previous years shall be
made against any property prior to the date of ownership of
the person owning such property at the time the liability for
such omitted tax was first ascertained, provided, that an assess-
ment of real or personal property omitted from taxation by a
decedent during his lifetime, shall be made against said prop-
erty and be assessed in the name of the personal representative
as executor, administrator, or trustees of such decedent's estate.
The owner of real or personal property, and the executor, ad-
ministrator or trustees of a decedent, whose property may have
been omitted in the assessment in any year or number of years,
or on which a tax for which such property was liable, has not
been paid, and the several taxing bodies interested therein,
shall be given at least five days' notice in writing by the board
of the hearing on the proposed assessment of such omitted prop-
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erty and the board shall have full power to examine the owner
or the executor, administrator, trustees, legatees or heirs of such
decedent or other person touching the ownership, kind, charac-
ter, amount and the value of such omitted property or credits.
Third-If the board shall determine that the property of any
decedent was omitted from assessment during any year or num-
ber of years or that a tax for which such property was liable
has not been paid, it shall be the duty of said board to give writ-
ten notice to the executor, administrator or trustees of such de-
cedent of the assessments made against such property and the
amount thereof, and thereupon it shall be the duty of such ex-
ecutor, administrator or trustees to retain in his or their hands
sufficient of the assets of such decedent's estate to pay the tax
when extended on such assessment and it shall be the duty of
the county clerk to file in the county or probate court a copy
of such assessment together with the rate of taxation thereon,
certified by such county clerk and upon the filing of such cer-
tificate the county or probate court shall enter an order di-
recting such executor, administrator or trustee to deposit with
the clerk of the court or to sequester sufficient of the assets of
said estate to pay the taxes on said assessments when extended
as now provided by law or to enter into bond in double the
amount of said tax with sureties to be approved by the court con-
ditioned for the payment of said tax when so extended, and
when so extended by the county clerk the full amount of such
tax shall be a claim of the first class against such estate: Pro-
vided, however, that an assessment of omitted property by the
board of review in the manner provided in this act shall not be
subject to review by any succeeding board.
For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act, the
several taxing bodies interested therein are hereby empowered
to employ counsel to appear before said board and take all nec-
essary steps to enforce the assessment on such omitted property.
The court then continues as follows:
The first three of the four sections were enacted in 1872 and
have been modified by section 35 as amended in 1915. Section
276 has been rendered partially inapplicable to this or any other
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proceeding since the amendment of section 35.24 The local as-
sessor is no longer required to list and assess the property, but
by section 35 the Board of Review is required to do this. It
will also be noted that the administrator or owner of property
is not required to list property under any one of these four sec-
tions.
We think it is clear, after a careful consideration of said
four sections, that the property in question was properly listed
and assessed by the board of review in school district No. 38
and that the demurrer of the appellees was properly sustained
by the court. One of the things made prominent in these four
sections is, that no such charge for taxes and interest shall be
made against any property prior to the date of ownership of
the person owning such property at the time the liability for
such omitted tax was first ascertained, and that that owner, if
known, shall be notified of such assessment. In case the owner
is dead the property itself is directly taxed but in the name
of the administrator, if there is one, because there is no owner
of the property for the years taxed and because he is possessed
of the funds that must pay the tax. It is clear that there is no
liability against the administrator personally for such tax by
such assessment until all the requirements of section 35 are com-
plied with, and that his liability is the same then as on any
other probated claim and sufficient funds are in the estate to
pay the same. This section treats the claim for taxes as an orig-
inal claim against the decedent and allows it to be probated as a
first-class claim against the estate. This shows clearly that it
is not a claim against the administrator as owner of the prop-
erty, as taxes assessed against the property of the decedent for
the years after his appointment and before distribution are re-
garded....
Another reason for our conclusion is, that the omitted assess-
ments and taxes are referred to in these sections as "the arrear-
ages of tax which might have been assessed," and it is pro-
vided by the statute that a penalty of ten per cent interest
thereon shall be collected "from the time the same ought to have
24 Citing People v. Sellars, 179 ill. 170; Stevens v. Henry County,
218 Ill. 468; People v. Webb, 256 Ill. 364; People v. National Box Co.,
248 fl1. 141.
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been paid." Arrears or arrearages, as defined by our best
lexicographers, are some things overdue and unpaid, outstand-
ing debts or liabilities, and that is a common definition of these
terms when found in the law.25  Interest is the legal damages
or penalties for the unjust detention of money, as used in this
statute.26 There were no arrearages against the administrator
as owner and no reason for assessing a penalty against him as
owner. He was in no fault whatever. There was nothing due ap-
pellants from the decedent or his estate for arrearages, and hence
there was no reason to penalize the estate or the administrator
by allowing to appellants interest as a penalty. There was
every reason for allowing interest or a penalty against deced-
ent's estate to school district No. 38.
In conclusion we may add that it is not possible for the county
clerk to "find the person owing such uncollected tax assessed"
for the subsequent years aforesaid, as provided in section 276,
because such owner is dead, and the administrator is not the
one owing the tax, within the, meaning of that section. It would
not be proper, therefore, for the county clerk to add these taxes
for arrearages to the taxes of the administrator which he owes
as administrator or owner to appellants. Neither the adminis-
trator nor the, deceased ever owed such arrears to appellants.
The deceased in his lifetime did justly owe these arrearages to
school 'district No. 38. His estate now owes them to that dis-
trict, and section 35 contemplates that that debt "shall be a
claim of the first class" in favor of that district and not in
favor of appellants. The general rule of law is that, in the ab-
sence of a statutory provision to the contrary, property should
be assessed and taxed in the name of the owner at the place
where he resides and in favor of the taxing district in which he
resides, for all years that the same is taxed .... No one of the
sections provides in terms where those arrears should be as-
sessed and taxed, but from all the provisions of those sections
the implication is strong. that school district No. 38 is to have
the.benefit of those assessments, and we must so interpret the
statute.
25 Citing Hollingsworth v. Willis, 64 Miss. 152.
26 Citing County of Madison v. Bartlett, 1 Scar. 67.
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There are three propositions of law which should be
considered as a result of the foregoing decision:
The first is that the Revenue Act of Illinois in force
between July 1, 1915, and February 12, 1932, did not
require the personal representative of a deceased per-
son to file a schedule on behalf of such deceased for any
year during which such personal representative was not
acting as such on the first day of April of the year or
years in question. For in its opinion the court says in
referring to sections 276, 277, 278 and section 35, of
the Revenue Act: "It will also be noted that the ad-
ministrator or owner of property is not required to list
property under any one of these four section6."
The second proposition of law presented is that under
the.Revenue Act in force between July 1, 1915, and Feb-
ruary 12, 1932, the Board of Review has the power to
make an assessment against property belonging to a de-
ceased owner in the name of. the administrator or execu-
tor if there is one where such property has not been as-
sessed in the decedent's lifetime and that there is no per-
sonal liability against the administrator personally for
such tax resulting from such assessment until all the re-
quirements of section 35 are complied with and his liabil-
ity is the same then as on any other probated claim and
sufficient funds are in the estate to pay the same.27
The third proposition of law suggested by this case is
that the assessment when made under the Revenue Act
in force between July 1, 1915 and February 12, 1932,
for the years when the deceased was alive should be
assessed in the School District in which deceased lived
on April 1 of the year for which such assessment is be-
ing levied.28
In regard to the second suggested proposition the case
is not particularly strong, because the principal ques-
tion before the court was whether or not the property
27 See pp. 198 and 199 of the court's opinion.
28 See p. 200 of the court's opinion.
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should be taxed in one school district or another and the
administrator did not question the right of one or the
other of the two school districts involved to require the
property to be assessed. In other words, the court was
assuming that a legal assessment could be made if sec-
tion 35 was complied with.
In line with this thought it is interesting to note that
in People v. Sears29 the court commented on'Board of
Education v. Boger as follows:
In the last case cited [the Boger case] the board of review of
Du Page county for the year 1919 made an assessment against
the personal jroperty of William P. Cowan, who died on August
13, 1918, which it found had not been listed for assessment for
the years 1914 to 1918 .... The only question mentioned or de-
cided in the case was whether the omitted property should be
assessed in the district where the decedent resided when the
property was omitted from assessment, or in the district where
the administrator resided on April 1, 1919, after the deced-
ent's death. No question was made about the right of the
board of review to make an assessment. In fact, the interest of
all the parties was the same, so far as this question was con-
cerned, except the administrator, and he had no interest one
way or the other. He might have had an interest in the pro-
ceedings of the board making the assessment, but it was a mat-
ter of indifference to him, as administrator, to which of the
school districts he paid the taxes. The board of review and all
the school districts believed that the assessment was within the
power of the board, and therefore no question about it arose in
the case or was considered or decided. The court decided simply
the question submitted by the parties that the assessment, when
made, should be in district where the decedent resided when
the omission occurred. It thus appears that in the case cited by
the appellee the court did not decide that the assessor or the
board of review had any power to make an assessment of per-
sonal property omitted by a deceased owner in his lifetime and
charge it against his executor, administrator or legatee.
29 344 Ill. 189 at p. 196.
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From the language in this case the court appears to
cast some doubt upon the right to assess property of a
deceased person not assessed in his lifetime even after
the amendment in 1915 of section 35 and refuses to ac-
cept as correct the statement of the court in the Boger
Case that such an assessment can be made. It was neces-
sary, however, for the court in the Boger Case to decide
the first and third suggested propositions of law be-
cause they were material to the court's decision.
The next case in Illinois which may have some bearing
upon the period between July 1, 1915, and February
12, 1932, and which is deserving of careful analysis is the
case of People v. Ballans, Admx.8 0 The facts in this
case are that on April 2, 1918, David Ballans died intes-
tate, leaving no widow surviving him and leaving as his
sole heir-at-law his daughter, Anna M. Ballans. Letters
of administration were issued by the County Court of
Bureau County, Illinois, to the daughter. An appraiser
was appointed to appraise the property for the pur-
pose of fixing the inheritance tax. He valued the real
estate at $64,308.03 and the personal property at $72,-
173.61.
Among other things, the County Court, in fixing the
tax, allowed a deduction of $1,243.30 for the 1918 tax
on real and personal property belonging to the estate.
The Attorney General prayed an appeal to the Supreme
Court claiming that the court erred in allowing the above
deduction and several other deductions not here impor-
tant to be considered. The State contended that be-
cause the regular 1918 taxes were not fixed in amount
and were not due and payable until long after the death
of the deceased no deduction should be made on account
thereof for the purpose of determining the amount of
the estate subject to inheritance tax. He further con-
tended that, for the purpose of the inheritance tax, real
and personal property taxes should not be deducted un-
less the decedent died subsequent to the time the books
80 294 Ill. 551.
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were delivered to the collector. In passing upon this
contention the court said:
Paragraph 302 of the chapter on revenue (Hurd's Stat. 1917,
p. 2482) provides that all property subject to taxation shall
be listed with reference to the ownership thereof on the first
day of April in each year and that the owner of such property
on the first day of April shall be liable for the taxes for that
year. Paragraph 347 of the same chapter provides that taxes
upon real property shall be a prior and first lien on such real
property from and including the first day of April in the year
in which the taxes are levied. Paragraph 254 of the same chap-
ter provides that the taxes assessed upon personal property
shall be a lien upon the personal property of the person assessed
from and after the time the tax books are received by the col-
lector, and paragraph 346 provides that the county clerk shall
deliver the books to the collector on the second day of January
following the year in which such taxes are levied. In the case
of personal property tax there is a personal liability for the
taxes, and this liability is independent of the tax lien. There-
fore an action may be brought against the tax-payer for the
taxes, whether there is or is not a lien in existence.... As only
the beneficial interest passing from the deceased to the heir are
subject to the inheritance tax, we think the real estate taxes
were clearly deductible. By paragraph 6 of the chapter on
revenue the administratrix was required to list the personal
property of her father's estate. Since this property was owned
by her father on the first day of April, 1918, she was required
to list the property then owned by him as the property of the
estate. Personal property does not pass directly from the de-
ceased to his next of kin, so all that appellee will take is what
may be coming to her from the estate on its distribution after
settlement. The administratrix is regarded by the statute in
matters of taxation as the legal owner and possessor of the prop-
erty after her appointment and until the property is distributed
and is therefore made personally responsible for the taxes. Ap-
pellee was personally liable as administratrix of her father's
estate for the personal property taxes assessed against his estate
for the year 1918, and the amount paid by her for such taxes
was an expenditure of the administratrix and never passed to
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her as next of kin of deceased, and therefore this amount was
not subject to the inheritance tax.
In analyzing this case it is difficult to see upon what
basis the court predicated its statement that the admin-
istratrix under paragraph 6 of the Revenue Act was
.required to list the personal property of her father's
estate, particularly in view of the fact that the court in
Scott v. People and Board of Education v. Boger, hereto-
fore cited, had previously held that section 6 of the
Revenue Act applies only to property in the possession
of the personal representative on April 1 of any given
year. Again, in the later opinion of People v. Sears, the
court discussed paragraph 6 and held that it applied
only to property in the hands of the personal represen-
tative on April 1 of any given year and did not require
a personal representative to schedule property which
he did not have in his possession or under his control as
such representative on the first of April. In view of the
Scott Case, the Boger Case, and Sears Case, the state-
ment of the court in the Ballans Case that the personal
representative was required to list the property of her
father which was owned on the first day of April, 1918,
is not supported by previous decisions nor by subsequent
decisions. In fact it is entirely contrary to previous
rulings of the court and is contrary to subsequent rul-
ing of the court in the Sears Case. The same may be
said with respect to the statement of the court that the
appellee was personally liable as administratrix of her
father's estate for the personal property taxes assessed
against his estate for the year 1918. The opinion does
not disclose whether or not she filed a schedule on be-
half of her father's estate. If she did, and this fact was
before the court at the time it decided this case, then
the reasoning of the court is understandable, because by
filing a schedule the personal representative would prob-
ably have assumed personal liability as administratrix
of her father's estate for the tax. There was nothing in
the amendment of 1915 of the Revenue Act which placed
any burden upon the personal representative to schedule
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personal property belonging to her father on April 1 of
the year 1918.
There is a provision, however, in the amendment, upon
which the court might properly have decided that the
personal property tax in question was a proper deduc-
tion for the purpose of fixing inheritance taxes. The
provision referred to is section 35, which provides, in
substance, that if the statute as amended, is complied
with, personal property taxes for years during which
the decedent was alive may be allowed as a first class
claim against his estate. If this statute is valid and
the tax could be allowed as a first class claim against
the decedent's estate, then it would be a proper deduc-
tion for inheritance tax purposes and the Supreme Court
might better have predicated its decision in the Ballans
Case upon this amendment to the Revenue Act rather
than following the reasoning which it did pursue in
arriving at its conclusion.
It is true that the case of People v. Sears was decided
under the law in force prior to the amendment of 1915,
but it is equally true that there was nothing in the
amendment of 1915 which compelled the personal repre-
sentative to file a schedule on behalf of such representa-
tive's deceased, nor was there anything in the amend-
ment adding to the personal liability of the personal
representative for taxes assessed against a deceased
person where the personal representative was not acting
as such on April 1 of the year for which the tax was
assessed, except and unless the statute providing for
making the tax a debt of the estate and having it al-
lowed as a first class claim against the estate was com-
plied with. Hence, the recent ruling of the court in
People v. Sears that the personal representative need
not schedule on behalf of the deceased for any year dur-
ing which the personal representative was not acting as
such on April 1 is, in the opinion of the writer, better
applicable than the statement of the court with respect
to the duty of the personal representative in People v.
Ballans.
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On February 13, 1932, Senate Bill No. 14 was ap-
proved by the Legislature of Illinois to take effect upon
its passage. This bill is entitled "An Act to Amend
sections two, three, five, thirteen, twenty-one, twenty-
three, thirty, thirty-two, thirty-three, thirty-four, thirty-
five, thirty-seven, thirty-eight, thirty-nine, forty-two,
forty-three, forty-four and forty-seven of 'An Act for
the assessment of property and providing the means
therefor, and to repeal a certain Act therein named,'
approved February 25 1898, as amended and to add
sections 32a, 33a, 35a, 35b, 35c, 35d, 35e, 35f, 35g and 35h
thereto." The principal sections which were amended
or which were added and which have any bearing upon
the questions involved in this discussion are paragraphs
first, second and third of section 35 and new section 35a,
b, c and d. By the amendment, section 35, clauses first,
second, and third, are amended to read as follows:
S. 35. In counties having less than two hundred fifty thou-
sand inhabitants, the board of review shall, in any year, whether
the year of the quadrennial assessment or not:
First: Assess all property subject to assessment which shall
not have been assessed by the assessor, and list and assess all
property real or personal that may have been omitted in the as-
sessment of any year or number of years, or if the tax thereon,
for which such property was liable, from any cause has not
been paid, or if any such property, by reason of defective de-
scription or assessment thereof, shall fail to pay taxes for any
year or years, in either case the same when discovered shall be
listed and assessed by the board in its revision of assessments,
and the board may make such alteration in the description of
real or personal property as it shall deem necessary.
Second: No such charge for tax of previous years shall be
made against any property prior to the date of ownership of
the person owning such property at the time the liability for
such omitted tax was first ascertained: Provided, that an assess-
ment of real or personal property omitted from taxation by a
decedent during his lifetime, shall be made against said prop-
erty and be assessed in the name of the personal representative
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as executor, administrator or trustees of such decedent's estate.
The owner of real or personal property, and the executor, ad-
ministrator or trustees of a decedent, whose property may have
been omitted in the assessment in any year or number of years,
or on which a tax for which such property was liable, has not
been paid, and the several taxing bodies interested therein, shall
be given at least five days notice in writing by the board, of the
hearing on the proposed assessment of such omitted property,
and the board shall have full power to examine the owner, or
the executor, administrator, trustees, legatees or heirs of such
decedent or other person touching the ownership, kind, character,
amount and the value of such omitted property or credits.
Third:' If the board shall determine that the property of any
decedent was omitted from assessment during any year or num-
ber of years or that a tax for which such property was liable
has not been paid, it shall be the duty of said board to give
written notice to the executor, administrator or trustees 'of such
decedent of the assessments made against such property and the
amount thereof, and thereupon it shall be the duty of. such
executor, administrator or trustees to retain in his or their hands
sufficient of the assets of such decedent's estate to pay the tax
when extended on such assessment, and it shall be the duty of
the county. clerk to file in the County or Probate Court, a copy
of such assessment, together with the rate of taxation thereon
certified by such county clerk, and upon the filing of such cer-
tificate, the County or Probate Court shall enter an order direct-
ing such executor, administrator or trustees to deposit with the
clerk of the court or to sequester sufficient of the assets of said
estate to pay the taxes on said assessments when extended as
now provided by law, or to enter into -bond in double the
amount of said tax with sureties to be approved by -the court
conditioned for the payment of said tax when soextended, and
when so extended by the county clerk, the full amount of such
tax shall be a claim of the first class against such estate': Pro-
vided, however, that an assessment of omitted property by the
board of review in the manner provided in this Act shall not be
subject to review by any succeeding board.
For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act, the
several taxing bodies interested therein are hereby empowered
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to employ counsel to appear before said board and take all neces-
sary steps to enforce the assessment on such omitted property.
The foregoing amendments it will be noticed are only
applicable in counties having less than 250,000 inhabi-
tants. New section 35a, paragraphs (a) (b) and (c)
and new section 35d read as follows:
S. 35a.-In counties containing two hundred fifty thousand or
more inhabitants the board of appeals in any year shall
(a) On complaint that any property is over assessed or under
assessed, or is exempt, review and order such assessment cor-
rected;
(b) Order the county assessor to correct any mistake or error
(other than mistakes or errors of judgment as to the valuation
of any real or personal property) in the manner provided in
section 35c of this Act; and
(c) Direct the county assessor to assess all property sub-
ject to assessment which he has not assessed, for any reason and
enter the same upon the assessment books and to list and assess
all property, real or personal, that has been omitted in the as-
sessment of any year, or number of years, or if the tax thereon,
for which such property was liable from any cause, has not been
paid or if any such property, by reason of defective description
or assessment thereof, fails to pay taxes for any year or years,
in either case the same, when discovered by the board shall be
listed and assessed by the county assessor and the board may
order the county assessor to make such alterations in the de-
scription of real or personal property as it deems necessary.
S. 35d.-The owner of real or personal property and the ex-
ecutor, administrator or trustee of a decedent whose property
may have been omitted in the assessment in any year or number
of years or on which a tax for which such property was liable
has not been paid and the several taxing bodies interested there-
in shall be given at least five days notice in writing by the board
of appeals in counties containing two hundred fifty thousand or
more inhabitants of the hearing on the proposed assessments of
such omitted property, and the board shall have full power to
examine the owner, or the executor, administrator, trustee, lega-
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tee or heirs of such decedent, or other person touching the own-
ership, kind, character, amount and the value of such omitted
property or credits.
If the board determines that the property of any decedent
was omitted from assessment during any year or number of
years, or that a tax for which such property was liable, has not
been paid, said board shall direct the county assessor to assess
such property. No charge for tax of previous years shall be
made against any property prior to the date of ownership of the
person owning such property at the time the liability for such
omitted tax is first ascertained: Provided, that an assessment
of real or personal property omitted from taxation by a deced-
ent during his lifetime, shall be made against said property and
it shall be assessed in the name of the personal representatives
as executor, administrator or trustee of the decedent's estate.
The County assessor shall give written notice to the executor,
administrator or trustees of such decedent, of the assessments
made against such property, and the amount thereof, and there-
upon, such executor, administrator or trustee, shall retain in his
or their hands, sufficient of the assets of such decedent's estate
to pay the tax when extended on such assessment, and the
county clerk shall file in the County or Probate Court, a copy
of such assessment, together with the rate of taxation thereon,
certified by such county clerk, and upon the filing of such cer-
tificate, the County or Probate Court shall enter an order di-
recting such executor, administrator or trustee to deposit with
the clerk of the court, or to sequester sufficient of the assets of
said estate to pay the taxes on said assessments, when extended,
as provided by law, or to enter into bond in double the amount
of said tax, with sureties to be approved by the court condi-
tioned for the payment of said tax when so extended by the
county clerk, the full amount of such tax shall be a claim of
the first class against such estate. The assessment of omitted
property by the county assessor may be reviewed by the board
of appeals in the same manner as other assessments are re-
viewed under the provisions of this Act and when so reviewed
such assessment shall not thereafter be subject to review by any
succeeding board.
For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Act, relat-
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ing to property omitted from assessments, the several taxing
bodies interested therein are hereby empowered to employ coun-
sel to appear before said board and take all necessary steps to
enforce the assessment on such omitted property.
The writer's only purpose in setting forth the amend-
ment which applies to counties having a population of
less than 250,000 is to enable the reader to make a com-
parison between the language used in the amended sec-
tion and the new sections, which latter only apply to
counties having a population in excess of 250,000. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in the case of People v.
Sears the amendment to section 35 of the Act of 1898
which became effective on July 1, 1915, contains all the
provisions for the assessment of real or personal prop-
erty omitted from taxation by decedent during his life-
time after the amendment became effective if the de-
ceased died subsequent to the amendment. If this is
true, paragraphs 291, 292 and 293 of Cahill's Illinois
Revised Statutes 1931 which are hereinbefore set forth
insofar as they apply to the assessment of personal
property belonging to a deceased person are abrogated
by the amendment to section 35 adopted in 1915 and
would continue to be abrogated by section 35 as amend-
ed in 1932. A careful reading of the amendment to
section 35 adopted in 1932 and new section 35a, sub-
sections (a) (b) and (c) and new section 35d discloses
that there is nothing about these amendments or these
new sections which changes the duty of the personal
representative to file a schedule on behalf of a deceased
-where the personal representative was not acting on
April 1 of the year for which the tax is being assessed,
or which changes the liability of the personal represen-
tative for a tax assessed against the personal property
of a deceased person in the name of the personal rep-
resentative who was appointed after April 1 of the year
for which the assessment is levied. In fact, there is a
remarkable similarity in language between section 35
before the amendment and the new sections were added
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in 1932 and section 35 after it was amended and the new
sections were added in 1932.
If there was an effort to change the duty and liability
of the personal representative as to filing a schedule
and paying a tax for any year where the personal rep-
resentative was not acting as such on April 1 of the
taxable year (which effort the writer does not believe
was made) it is interesting to note in passing what the
result would have been in the cases where the deceased
died prior to the amendment in 1932.
In view of the language used by the court in the case
of People v. Sears relative to the effect of the amend-
ment adopted on July 1, 1915, it is difficult to see where-
in the legislature by the Act of 1932 could change the
duty of a personal representative to file a schedule or
increase the liability of the personal representative for
personal property tax in any case where the deceased
died prior to February 13, 1932, even if the legislature
was trying to do so. Perhaps the legislature could
legally designate different officials thereafter to levy as-
sessments on personal property belonging to deceased
persons who died prior to the adoption of the amend-
ment and new sections in 1932, but even if they were
trying to do so, the amendment and new sections added
in 1932 could not be retroactive so as to change the
personal liability of the personal representative for a
personal property tax where the deceased died prior to
the adoption of the amendment and new sections. How-
ever, as stated before, a close examination of the statute
discloses that even by the amendment and new sections
which were added in 1932, the legislature did not there-
by seek or intend thereafter to change the duty of the
personal representative to file a schedule for any year
in which such personal representative was not acting as
such on April 1 or to increase the personal liability of
the personal representative for taxes assessed against
the property of a deceased person during any given
year in which the personal representative was not act-
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ing as such on April 1 of the taxable year. On the
contrary, the provisions in section 35 as amended in
1915 directing the County Clerk to file a claim in the
Probate Court for such tax are specifically retained in
new section 35 as amended and added to in 1932.
The question which now presents itself is whether or
not the provisions of the Revenue Act in force from
1915 to February 12, 1932, and in force from February
13, 1932 up to the present time providing for the filing
of a claim against the estate of a deceased person for
personal property taxes assessed against a deceased per-
son in the name of the personal representative appointed
after April 1 of the year in which the deceased person
died, is the only method by which the administrator can
be made liable for the tax to the extent of assets which
he receives in this capacity as administrator.
In People v. Hibernian Bank, previously cited, the
court decided that it was not necessary to file any claim
against the estate of a deceased person for personal
property tax assessed against such estate for any year
during which the personal representative was acting as
such on April 1 of the year for which the assessment
was levied. The reasoning of the court in this regard is
entirely sound, because under section 6 of the Revenue
Act the personal representative under such circum-
stances is required to file a schedule and is given a lien
upon the property of the estate for the purpose of pro-
tecting himself in the payment of the taxes assessed for
the taxable years in which he was acting as administra-
tor or executor on April 1. This case however clearly
has no application to the question of whether or not a
claim can be filed where the tax is assessed as of April
1 for the year or years during which the personal rep-
resentative was not acting as such on April 1.
In Board of Education v. Boger, already referred to,
the court discussed this question and said:
In case the owner is dead the property itself is directly taxed
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but in the name of the administrator, if there is one, because
there is no owner of the property for the years taxed and be-
cause there is no owner of the property for the years taxed
and because he is possessed of the funds that must pay the tax.
It is clear that there is no liability against the administrator
personally for such tax by such assessment until all the re-
quirements of section 35 are complied with, and that his lia-
bility is the same then as on any other probated claim and suf-
ficient funds are in the estate to pay the same. This section
treats the claim for taxes as an original claim against the de-
cedent and allows it to be probated as a first-class claim against
the estate. This shows clearly that it is not a claim against the
administrator as owner of the property, as taxes assessed against
the property of the decedent for the years after his appointment
and before distribution are regarded.
It will be recalled that in the Boger Case the deceased
died on August 13, 1918, and a portion of the tax in
question involved the tax assessed as of April, 1918.
The deceased was therefore alive at the time his lia-
bility accrued, yet the court was of the opinion that only
in the event the provisions of section 35 were complied
with, would the personal representative become person-
ally liable for such tax and that his liability would be
the same then as on any other probated claim and suffi-
cient funds are in the estate to pay the same. In view
of the fact that section 35, as amended in 1932, and the
new sections which were added at that time do not sub-
stantially change the duty or liability of the personal
representative which existed under section 35 as it was
in force at the time the court decided the Boger Case,
it would seem clear that unless new section 35a sub-
sections (a) (b) and (c) and new section 35d are com-
plied with, there is no duty upon the personal represen-
tative to file a schedule on behalf of a deceased person
for any year in which such personal representative was
not acting in such capacity on April 1 of such year and
that such personal representative has no liability for
such tax unless and until said new section 35a, sub-
sections (a) (b) and (c) and said new section 35d are
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complied with. It is true that People v. Ballans, already
cited, was decided after the case of Board of Education
v. Boger. It is also true that in this case the court
stated that there was a duty on the personal represen-
tative to file a schedule and that such personal represen-
tative became liable for such tax even though such per-
sonal representative was not acting as such on the first
day of April of the year in which such schedule was to
be filed, but the statement of the court in this case is
predicated upon a misconception of the interpretation of
section 6 of the Revenue Act. Furthermore, the con-
struction of section 6 as adopted by the court was not
necessary to its decision because there were ample provi-
sions in section 35 of the Revenue Act in force at the
time the taxable liability accrued and the decision was
given, to sustain the court in its ultimate conclusion
that the estate was entitled to a deduction for personal
property taxes where the deceased died on April 2 of
the year for which the tax was assessed. Also, it should
be borne in mind, in connection with this case, that it is
not clear from the opinion whether or not the personal
representative assumed liability for tax in question by
filing a schedule. In fact, a careful examination of the
case rather leads one to believe that such a schedule
was filed.
In the case of People v. Sears, the court did not have
to construe section 35, as it was in force after the
amendment of 1915 up to February 13th, 1932, but in
commenting upon the section, nevertheless, stated:
The provisions for the assessment of real or personal property
omitted from taxation by decedent during his lifetime are all
contained in the second and third paragraphs of this amendment
and must be considered as having become the law on July 1,
1915....
Apparently the court felt that section 35 as amended
in 1915, contained the only provisions and defined all of
the liability of the personal representative for taxes as-
sessed against a deceased person for any given year in
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which the personal representative was not acting as such
on April 1 of such year.
The next question which arises is at what place the
assessment is to be made where it is being made against
the deceased in the name of a personal representative
appointed after April 1 of the year for which the as-
sessment is being made.
On this question we can again refer to Board of Edu-
cation v. Boger, which indicates very clearly that the
assessment would have to be made in the taxing district
in which the deceased resided on April 1 of the year for
which the assessment is being levied and should not be
made in the taxing district where the person who is
appointed after April 1 of such year resides. This con-
tention is further supported by the case of People v.
Culver,31 in which the facts were as follows:
Appellant lived in the Village of Glencoe, in Cook
County and maintained a law office in the town of South
Chicago, in the City of Chicago. His office equipment
was permanently located in that town. The Board of
Assessors of Cook County, in the absence of a list re-
turned by him of personal property, estimated the value
of his personal property subject to taxation in the
Village of Glencoe for the year 1919, and also returned
an estimated value of the personal property of appellant
in the Town of South Chicago for said year to be taxed
in the latter town. The taxes estimated thereon
amounted to $46.26. Appellant paid the taxes assessed
against the property in the Village of Glencoe but ob-
jected to the payment of the taxes levied against his
office equipment in the town of South Chicago on the
ground that the Board of Assessors had no authority
to assess his personal property at any other place than
in the village where he resides. The appellee contended
that since the personal property in question was per-
manently located in the town of South Chicago, it was,
81 304 I. 566.
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in the absence of a showing that it had been included
with the personal property located within the Village of
Glencoe, properly assessed in the town of South Chi-
cago. In discussing this question the court said:
The power of a board of assessors to make an assessment of
personal property is derived from section 7, and other sections
therein referred to, of the Revenue act. Section 7 is in part as
follows: "Personal property, except such as is required in this
act to be listed and assessed otherwise, shall be listed and as-
sessed in the county, town, city, village or district where the
owner resides." ... It is clear from the stipulation filed in this
case that unless the property in question comes within the pro-
vision of section 7 of the Revenue Act relating to property
"required in this act to be listed and assessed otherwise," the
board of assessors was without power to assess it in any taxing
district other than the one in which appellant resides. As a
general rule, the taxable situs of personal property, moneys and
credits is the domicile of the owner. The exceptions to this
rule referred to in section 7 of the Revenue Act include cases
where the owner is a non-resident or has listed property in the
taxing district where the same was assessed though living in
another taxing district, and cases which come within the express
statutory exceptions. There is nothing in this case to bring it
within any of the exceptions to the rule prescribed in section 7.
Appellant did not list his personal property located in the town
of South Chicago for assessment in that town and there is noth-
ing in the character of his property which brings it within any
specific statutory exception to the general rule....
Appellee cites Totman v. Raymond, 202 Ill. 197. That case
is to be distinguished from the case at bar. There the property
holder voluntarily filed a schedule of personal property in the
town where he had his business office, in addition to the sched-
ule filed in the town where he resided. This distinction on the
facts is sufficient to show the inapplicability of that case to the
one under consideration.
An examination of the Revenue Act discloses that
there are no exceptions included in the section referred
to by the court in its opinion which renders the princi-
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ple commonly involved in this case inapplicable to cases
where the tax is assessed against the personal property
of a deceased person in the name of a personal repre-
sentative who was appointed after April 1 of the year
for which the assessment is levied.
In view of this case, and Board of Education v. Boger,
if the taxing authorities did elect to pursue the remedy
provided for them under section 35 as amended in 1915,
and section 35 as amended in 1932, together with the
new sections added thereto, the tax to be legally assessed
and collectible as a first class claim against the estate
would have to be assessed in the taxing district in which
the decedent resided during the respective years for
which the tax is being assessed, such residence being de-
termined, it would seem, as of April 1 of the year for
which the assessment is being levied. If this is true, then
what would happen in case of the death of the deceased
prior to the first of April of the year for which the assess-
ment is being levied, and the appointment of a personal
representative for him after April 1 of such year ? Could
a tax be assessed at all in such a case, and if it can be,
then in what taxing district should the assessment be
made? In other words, did section 35 as amended in
1915 or as amended and added to in 1932 create any
liability against the personal representative for a tax
even if a claim was filed against the estate of the de-
ceased, where the deceased died prior to April 1 of the
taxable year and the personal representative was not
appointed until after April 1 of such year? The answer
seems to be that there may be some doubt whether any
liability is created in such a case. In the first place it
is clear that before the amendment to section 35 in 1915
there was no liability for personal property tax on the
part of a personal representative except where he was
acting as such on April 1 of the taxable year. People
v. Sears and Scott v. People are very clear in this re-
gard.
Starting from this premise an examination of section
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35 as amended in 1915 does not show clearly that there
was any change in this liability after the amendment in
question if the deceased died prior to April 1 and his
personal representative was not appointed until after
April 1, because the language of the statute indicates
that it might refer only to property omitted from taxa-
tion by a decedent during his lifetime. The deceased be-
ing dead on April 1, the date when the tax liability, if
any, accrued, it might be urged that his property on
such date did not constitute "property omitted from tax-
ation in his lifetime" within the meaning of section 35
as amended in 1915. Substantially the same contention
might be advanced as to the meaning of the amendments
to section 35 and new sections added thereto in 1932.
Furthermore the difficulty of determining in what tax-
ing district the assessment is to be levied in such a
case might lend some weight to the contention. If this
contention is sound, then what has been said heretofore
with regard to the liability of personal representative
for personal property tax if section 35 as amended and
added to is complied with would apply only to cases
where the deceased was alive on April 1 of the taxable
year. If, on the other hand, section 35 as amended and
added to applies alike whether the deceased died before
or after April 1 of the taxable year and the personal
representative starts acting after April 1 then it would
seem that the taxable situs of the property would be
the taxing district in which he lived at the time of his
death.
There is one remaining question which has caused con-
siderable concern in connection with assessing personal
property taxes in the cases where the personal repre-
sentative is required to schedule under section 6. Is the
assessor bound to accept valuations placed on such prop-
erty by the person filing the schedule?
One of the leading cases in Illinois on this question is
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the case of People v. Kimmel82 In this case the Su-
preme Court stated:
If a tax-payer makes out and delivers to the assessor a list of
his taxable property, with the valuations thereon, and the sched-
ule and valuations are accepted by the assessor as correct, they
cannot afterwards be altered or changed without notice to the
taxpayer. The assessor, however, is not bound to accept the
tax payer's valuations of his property as correct, and if he does
not accept them he is not required to give notice to the tax-
payer of changes in valuation. 83 . . . It was not shown that the
County Assessor accepted appellants' valuation as correct. More-
over, the assessment as made by the assessor was published in
the local newspaper and appellants had notice of the increased
valuation. Pursuant to the notice so given appellants appeared
before the board of review and obtained a reduction in their as-
sessment. They availed themselves of the remedy provided by
law, and it cannot be assumed, in the absence of proof, that the
board of review placed a valuation upon their personal prop-
erty so excessive as to amount to fraud.
What would constitute an acceptance by the assessor
of the schedule and valuation set forth therein presents
a difficult situation. In the instant case the schedule
with the valuations contained therein was returned by
the tax-payer to the deputy assessor who, thereupon,
informed the tax-payer over the telephone that the valu-
ations placed upon the property described in the sched-
ule would have to be raised to certain figures and the
tax-payer then assented to such increases. The court
was of the opinion that it was not shown by these facts
that the County Assessor had accepted the tax-payer's
valuation as correct.
In conclusion the following summary can be made of
the laws applicable to the assessing and collecting of
personal property tax in Cook County, Illinois, in
estates of deceased persons from 1872 down to the pres-
ent date:
32 323 Ill. 261.
33 Citing Tolman v. Solomon, 191 Ill. 202.
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES IN ESTATES
First-From 1872 to July 1, 1915, the personal repre-
sentative was required to file a schedule of the dece-
dent's personal property for each taxable year during
which year such personal representative was acting as
such on the first day of April, and the personal repre-
sentative became personally liable for such tax, whether
the tax was based upon his schedule or based upon an
estimate made by the taxing authorities.
Second-From 1872 down to July 1, 1915, there was
no duty on the part of the personal representative to
file a schedule on behalf of a deceased person for any
taxable year during which the personal representative
was not acting as such on April 1. Furthermore the
taxing authorities in such case had no right to esti-
mate the value of the decedent's personal estate for the
years during which the personal representative was not
acting as such on April 1, and there was no liability
on the part of the personal representative for any per-
sonal property tax assessed during any taxable year
during which the personal representative was not acting
as such on April 1.
Third-Between July 1, 1915, and February 13, 1932,
it was the duty of the personal representative to file a
schedule for each taxable year during which he was
acting as such on April 1. If such schedule was not filed
the assessment could be estimated by the assessing au-
thorities and the personal representative became per-
sonally liable for the tax based upon his schedule or
based upon such estimated assessment.
Foutrth-From July 1, 1915, to February 13, 1932, if
the deceased died after April 1 of any taxable year there
was no duty on the part of the personal representative
to file a schedule for such taxable year during which the
personal representative was not acting as such on April
1, but the taxing authorities possibly could estimate the
amount of the personal property subject to assessment
and if a claim was filed and allowed against the estate
of the deceased in accordance with section 35 in force
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during said period, the liability of the personal repre-
sentative for the tax in such case was the same as on
any other probated claim and sufficient funds were in the
estate to pay the same. If, however, the provisions of
section 35 were not complied with, there would be no
liability on the part of the personal representative for
a tax based upon an estimated assessment.
Fifth--Between July 1, 1915, and February 13, 1932,
if the deceased died before April 1 and the personal rep-
resentative was appointed after April 1, there was no
duty on the part of the personal representative to file a
schedule on behalf of the deceased. In such case under
one construction which might be placed upon section 35
the assessing authorities might estimate the value of the
personal property and by filing a claim against the
estate the liability of the personal representative would
be the same as on any other probated claim and suffi-
cient funds are in the estate to pay the same. Under
another construction placed upon the act in question,
section 35 does not give the right in such case to the
assessing authorities to make an estimated assessment
and to file a claim for the tax based thereon. Under this
latter construction the estate and personal representa-
tive could not be held liable for any tax based upon an
estimated assessment made for any taxable year during
which the personal representative was not acting as such
on April 1.
Sixth-From February 13, 1932, to the present it has
been and is the duty of the personal representative to
file a schedule of the personal property belonging to a
decedent's estate for each year during which the per-
sonal representative is acting as such on April 1. If he
fails to file such a schedule the taxing authorities may
estimate the value of the personal property and a tax
can be extended thereon. In either event the personal
representative becomes personally liable for such tax.
Seventh-From February 13, 1932, to the present, if
the deceased was alive on April 1, there is no duty on
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the personal representative to file a schedule on behalf
of such deceased for such taxable year during which the
personal representative was not acting as such on April
1. It is very possible that in such case the taxing au-
thorities can estimate the amount of personal property
subject to assessment, have a tax extended thereon, and
file a claim against the estate for such tax, in which
event the liability of the personal representative would
be the same as on any other probated claim, and suffi-
cient funds are in the estate to pay the same. In the
absence of such steps being taken by the taxing authori-
ties there would be no liability for the tax based upon
an estimated assessment.
Eighth-From February 13, 1932, to the present, if
the deceased died before April 1 of the taxable year in
question and a personal representative was appointed
after April 1, there is no duty imposed upon the per-
sonal representative to file a schedule for such taxable
year. Under one construction of section 35 as amended
and added to in 1932 the taxing authorities could esti-
mate the amount of the assessment, have a tax extended
thereon, and file a claim against the deceased's estate in
which event the liability of the personal representative
would be the same as on any other probated claim and
sufficient funds are in the estate to pay the same. Under
another construction placed upon section 35 as amended
and added to in 1932 the taxing authorities, in the case
we are now supposing, could not estimate the amount of
personal property belonging to the deceased, nor have a
tax extended thereon, nor have a claim allowed against
the estate of the deceased for such tax, and under this
construction the estate or the personal representative of
the deceased could not be held liable for any tax based
upon an estimated assessment where the personal repre-
sentative was not acting as such on April 1 of the tax-
able year in question.
Ninth-During all three of the periods involved,
namely, from 1872 to July 1, 1915, and July 1, 1915, to
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February 13, 1932, and from February 13, 1932, to date,
where the personal representative is acting as such on
April 1 of the taxable year, the taxable situs of the prop-
erty scheduled by the personal representative, or upon
which an estimated assessment is made by the taxing
authorities, would be the taxing district in which the
personal representative resided on April 1.
Tenth-Between the two periods, namely, from July
1, 1915, to February 13, 1932, and from February 13,
1932, to date, where the deceased was alive on April 1
of the taxable year in question if the taxing authorities
sought to estimate the amount of the personal property
of the deceased, have a tax extended thereon, and file a
claim against the decedent's estate for said tax, the situs
of the personal property for the purpose of fixing the
amount of such estimated tax would be in the taxing
district in which the decedent resided on April 1 of the
taxable year involved.
Eleventlh--Between the two periods, namely, from
July 1, 1915, to February 13, 1932, and from February
13, 1932, to date, where the deceased died prior to April
1, and the personal representative was not appointed
until after April 1, and the taxing authorities seek to
estimate the value of the personal property of the de-
cedent as of April 1, have a tax extended thereon, and
file a claim against the estate of the deceased for such
tax, about which right there may be some doubt, the
situs of the personal property for the purposes of such
assessment would appear to be the taxing district in
which the decedent resided at the time of his death, or
if not in such district, then in the taxing district in
which the property was actually located.
Twelfth-Between the three periods, namely, from
1872 to July 1, 1915, from July 1, 1915, to February 13,
1932, and from February 13, 1932, to date, where the
personal representative was acting as such on April 1,
and a tax is assessed against him either upon a schedule
filed by him or upon an estimated assessment, the tax-
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ing bodies would not be required to file a claim against
the decedent's estate for such tax in order to render
the personal representative personally liable therefor.
Thirteenth-Between the two periods, namely, from
July 1, 1915, to February 13, 1932, and from February
13, 1932, to date, if the deceased died after April 1 of
the taxable year in question, in order to collect a tax
based upon an estimated assessment made by the tax-
ing authorities, it would be necessary for the taxing
authorities to file and have allowed in the Probate Court
a claim for such tax, and in the absence of such com-
pliance with the statute neither the estate of the de-
ceased nor his personal representative would incur any
liability for such tax.
Fourteenth-Between the two periods, namely, from
July 1, 1915, to February 13, 1932, and from February
13, 1932, to date, if the deceased died prior to April 1
and the personal representative was not appointed until
after April 1 and the taxing authorities tried to make
an estimated assessment and have a tax extended there-
on in order to render the estate of the deceased or the
personal representative liable for such tax, a claim
would have to be filed in and allowed by the Probate
Court for such tax and there is some doubt as to
whether or not such a claim should be allowed in such
case.
Fifteenth-Between the three periods, namely, from
1872 to July 1, 1915, from July 1, 1915, to February 13,
1932, and from February 13, 1932, to date, where the
personal representative is acting as such on April 1 of
the taxable year and as required by law makes out and
delivers to the Assessor a list of the taxable personal
property belonging to such estate with the valuations
thereon, and such schedule and valuations are accepted
by the Assessor as correct, they could not afterwards be
altered or changed without notice to the tax-payer. The
Assessor, however, is not bound to accept a personal
representative's valuations as correct and if the Asses-
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sor does not accept them it seems he would not be re-
quired to give notice to the personal representative of
any changes in the valuation.
Sixteenth--If the second construction of section 35 as
amended in 1915 or as amended or added to in 1932 (as
set forth in paragraphs fifth and eighth of the summary
herein) are correct, then it would appear to be the duty
of anyone having in his possession as agent or attorney
on April 1 of the taxable year any money and other
personal property invested, loaned or otherwise con-
trolled by him of the decedent's estate, to file a schedule
of such property pursuant to the requirements of the
second paragraph of section 6 of the Revenue Act, and
such person would have a lien upon the property until he
is indemnified against the payment of the tax, or if he
has paid the tax, until he is reimbursed for such pay-
ment, as provided in section 256 of the Revenue Act.
For such tax he could file a claim against the decedent's
estate if he had paid the same. Th practical result
would then be that the decedent's estate would be com-
pelled to pay the tax. In the event of such a schedule
being filed the situs of the property would be the taxing
district in which the agent or attorney resided.
